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Abstract 
An ever growing variety of smart, connected Internet of Things (IoT) devices poses completely new 
challenges for businesses regarding security and privacy. In fact, the adoption of smart products may 
depend on the ability of organizations to offer systems that ensure adequate sensor data integrity 
while guaranteeing sufficient user privacy. In light of these challenges, previous research indicates 
that blockchain technology could be a promising means to mitigate issues of data security arising in 
the IoT. Building upon the existing body of knowledge, we propose a design theory, including 
requirements, design principles, and features, for a blockchain-based sensor data protection system 
(SDPS) that leverages data certification. To support this, we designed and developed an instantiation 
of an SDPS (CertifiCar) in three iterative cycles intented to prevent the fraudulent manipulation of 
car mileage data. Following the explication of our SDPS, we provide an ex post evaluation of our 
design theory considering CertifiCar and two additional use cases in the areas of pharmaceutical 
supply chains and energy microgrids. Our results suggest that the proposed design ensures the 
tamper-resistant gathering, processing, and exchange of IoT sensor data in a privacy-preserving, 
scalable, and efficient manner. 
Keywords: Internet of Things, Big Data, Privacy, Security, Blockchain, Design Science Research, 
Design Theory. 
Matti Rossi was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on March 30, 2018, and underwent two 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, new forms of information technology 
(e.g., sensors and mobile devices) have dramatically 
expanded that which can be measured and analyzed, 
thereby posing completely new challenges regarding 
security and privacy (Lee, Cho, & Lim, 2018; Newell & 
Marabelli, 2015; Sicari, Rizzardi, Grieco, & Coen-
Porisini, 2015; Weber, 2010). The potential for 
information systems-related security and privacy issues 
to affect customers in their daily lives and private 
spheres makes these challenges top business priorities 
(Sicari et al., 2015). In fact, the adoption of smart 
products might depend on the ability of organizations to 
offer systems that ensure adequate security levels while 
guaranteeing sufficient user privacy (Sicari et al., 2016). 
Such Internet of Things (IoT) systems, referring to 
smart, connected devices, including cars, health 
applications, and industrial machinery, offer adversaries 
a whole new range of attack vectors for manipulating 
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information systems (Lowry et al., 2017; Porter & 
Heppelmann 2015). IoT systems are usually 
characterized by multiparty ecosystems, with data 
pipelines crossing organizational borders (Aggarwal et 
al., 2013; Roman et al., 2013). In such systems, 
malicious adversaries can manipulate “data at various 
stages in the [processing] pipeline,” from sensor to 
service, making data integrity a key concern (Aggarwal 
et al., 2013, p. 419). The information systems (IS) 
research community is well aware of these challenges 
and has specifically called for more design research to 
facilitate secure and reliable data processing and 
exchange in multiparty ecosystems (Bélanger & 
Crossler, 2011; Pavlou, 2011; Smith et al., 2011). 
Previous research has indicated that blockchain 
technology is a promising means to mitigate issues of 
data security arising in the IoT and has some decisive 
advantages over a conventional database system on 
central servers (Glaser, 2017; Hyvärinen et al., 2017; 
Nærland et al., 2017). More specifically, blockchains 
provide tamper-proof storage capabilities in the form of 
a distributed ledger that can be used to securely store and 
exchange IoT sensor data. However, core challenges, 
such as privacy, scalability, and potentially prohibitive 
transaction costs, still need to be addressed (Beck et al., 
2016; Notheisen et al., 2017; Risius & Spohrer 2017). 
While there are a variety of different blockchain-based 
IoT systems currently under development (Curtis, 2015; 
Mengelkamp et al., 2018; Modum, 2018), the 
corresponding academic research is still in its infancy 
(Avital et al., 2016; Beck et al., 2016, 2017; Beck & 
Müller-Bloch, 2017; Lindman et al., 2017). 
In the IS community, privacy and security have been 
widely discussed as multidisciplinary, diverse concepts 
(Lowry et al., 2017; Oetzel & Spiekermann, 2014; Sicari 
et al., 2015). However, most studies do not provide 
actionable solutions. In this regard, Bélanger and 
Crossler (2011) note in their seminal literature review 
that scholars should “conduct design and action research 
with an eye towards actual implementation” (p. 1035). 
Similarly, Pavlou (2011) proposes that future IS security 
and privacy studies should adapt the design science 
perspective, “with emphasis on building actual 
implementable tools” (p. 980). While multiple 
technologies are available to realize IoT sensor data 
protection systems (SDPSs) (Ayoade et al., 2018; 
Machado & Fröhlich, 2018; Margulies, 2015), limited 
prescriptive knowledge has been gathered to guide the 
development process of such systems. In addition, the 
potential of blockchain technology in SDPSs is, to the 
best of our knowledge, not yet reflected in the literature. 
Against this background, we contribute to the IS 
literature by establishing theoretical insights into how to 
design an SDPS and by explicitly developing and 
evaluating a blockchain-based SDPS. More specifically, 
we aim to answer the following research questions: 
RQ1:  What fundamental challenges arise in the 
context of IoT sensor data protection, and what 
requirements can be derived from these challenges 
for the design of information systems that facilitate 
IoT sensor data protection (i.e., SDPS)?  
RQ2: What actionable guidelines in the form of 
design principles and design features address these 
design requirements and inform the development of 
SDPS? 
RQ3: What is the value proposition of blockchain 
technology in the realm of SDPSs, and what 
fundamental design implications of blockchain-
based SDPSs must be considered? 
Overall, our research is geared toward a design theory 
that guides the development of SDPSs that are able to 
protect IoT sensor data in a privacy-preserving manner. 
To answer our research questions, we follow the 
guidelines of design science research (DSR) (Gregor & 
Jones, 2007; March & Smith, 1995). Within the IS 
community, the development of design knowledge, be it 
in the form of design theories, principles, or guidelines, 
is of high significance for both research and practice 
(Baskerville, 2008; Hevner et al., 2004; Winter, 2008) 
and continues to attract a great deal of interest 
(Baskerville et al., 2015; Gregor & Hevner, 2013; Rai, 
2017). We derive an artifact that consists of a set of 
interrelated design requirements, design principles, and 
design features. We demonstrate and refine our artifact 
on the basis of an instantiation that aims to prevent the 
fraudulent manipulation of car mileage data. Finally, we 
provide an ex post evaluation of the artifact and present 
our results in the form of a design theory. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In 
Section 2, we introduce the practical issues that 
motivated this study and provide an overview of the 
related literature, thus laying the groundwork for 
addressing RQ1. Section 3 elaborates upon the 
application of the design science research approach. The 
next four sections form the core of the paper and are 
depicted in Figure 1. In Section 4, we first describe the 
SDPS design requirements (RQ1) and proceed with the 
design principles and features (RQ2). In Section 5, we 
present the iterative development and evaluation of our 
artifact. Additionally, we evaluate the system ex post in 
Section 6. Thereby, we confirm and refine the 
conclusions of RQ1 and RQ2 and form the foundation 
to answer RQ3. In Section 7, we present our results on 
RQ1 and RQ2 in the form of a design theory, focus on 
RQ3 and the design implications, and present our 
contributions. The paper concludes with Section 8, 
which reflects on the potential limitations and presents 
promising avenues for future research.




Figure 1. Structure of the Core of the Paper 
 
2 Foundations 
2.1 Internet of Things and Sensor Data 
By dramatically expanding what can be measured and 
analyzed, digitization is predicted to affect all areas of 
our lives (McAfee et al., 2012; Newell & Marabelli, 
2015). Digitization refers to the technical 
transformation of information processing from analog 
to digital and, in a broader sense, to the ever-increasing 
use of digital technology and its associated economic 
and social implications (Loebbecke & Picot, 2015; 
Nambisan et al., 2017; Negroponte, 1995). In the 
course of the ongoing digital transformation, a growing 
amount of intelligent, connected devices, including 
industrial machinery, cars, and health applications, 
will traverse the traditional separation between the 
physical and digital worlds (Porter & Heppelmann, 
2015). The merger of these two worlds is widely 
referred to as the IoT and has recently gained 
significant attention in the IS literature and among 
practitioners (Iansiti & Lakhani, 2014; Loebbecke & 
Picot, 2015).  
According to Atzori et al. (2010), the IoT refers to “a 
vision that virtually any physical object can be 
connected to the Internet,” a vision in which smart, 
connected devices generate unprecedented amounts of 
sensor data that can be classified as “big data” (Chen 
et al., 2012). Big data, in turn, are characterized by the 
ever-increasing volume, velocity, and variety of data 
combined with veracity-related challenges (Clarke, 
2016; Goes, 2014; Schroeck et al., 2012). This holds 
true particularly for sensor data, which are increasing 
extraordinarily both in terms of the size and speed of 
data generation (Abbasi et al., 2016; Brynjolfsson & 
McAfee, 2012). In addition, sensor data are available 
in a variety of formats and from disparate sources 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012; Schroeck et al., 
2012). Finally, veracity considers the varying degrees 
of reliability and credibility of sensor data sources 
(Abbasi et al., 2016). In light of these growing datasets 
and the corresponding technical and economic 
challenges, companies are increasingly relying on 
cloud solutions, which are typically operated by third 
parties (Lowry et al., 2017). In addition, more and 
more companies exchange and share sensor data to 
foster cross-organizational collaborations (Anderson 
et al., 2017). 
2.2 Security and Privacy in the Internet 
of Things 
The ever growing variety of smart, connected IoT 
devices poses completely new challenges regarding 
security and privacy (Lee et al., 2018; Sicari et al., 
2015; Weber, 2010). Companies are increasingly 
moving toward cloud solutions and sharing sensor data 
in multiparty ecosystems (Anderson et al., 2017; 
Lowry et al., 2017). However, distributed processing 
and sharing data with third parties is risky, as 
participating stakeholders (companies and end users) 
might misuse or lose control over data (Anderson et al., 
2017; Moura & Serrão, 2016). Ultimately, the 
involvement of third parties significantly increases the 
risk of security and privacy breaches of IS systems 
(Lowry et al., 2017). In addition to intentional sharing 
in multiparty networks, unintentional access by 
malicious adversaries is a major security risk with IoT, 
especially because of its “architecture of wireless 
transmitters and sensors that…connect into vast global 
networks” (Lowry et al., 2017, p. 556). For example, 
the Internet connectivity of IoT devices can enable 
malware to quickly infect large populations around the 
globe (Kolias et al., 2017). Even the networking 
capabilities of devices that are not connected to the 
Internet can be exploited to spread malware quickly 
and unobtrusively (Ronen et al., 2017). This is because 
IoT sensors are usually unsupervised when collecting 
data, leaving them particularly prone to various 
security threats (Aggarwal et al., 2013; Atzori et al., 
2010; Ronen et al., 2017). The multilayered hardware 
and software stack of IoT solutions also makes these 
systems vulnerable to a variety of potential attacks 
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(Sicari et al., 2016). For instance, malicious 
adversaries can manipulate “data at various stages in 
the [data processing] pipeline,” from sensor to 
service, making data integrity a key concern 
(Aggarwal et al., 2013, p. 419). Furthermore, many of 
the existing security principles that companies use to 
protect their systems, including routers, gateways, 
and firewalls, are not applicable to the IoT, as they 
“simply do not work for smaller and more mobile 
‘things’” (Lowry et al., 2017, p. 556). 
Against this background, the IoT fundamentally 
challenges the field of IS security and privacy, 
requiring the redefinition of well-established rules 
and organizational practices to protect sensor data 
(Fernandes et al., 2017; Singh et al., 2016). The 
confidentiality and integrity of data are essential to 
security and privacy to ensure that personal data 
cannot be viewed or manipulated by objectionable 
third parties (Anderson et al., 2017; Baskerville & 
Siponen, 2002; Chellappa & Pavlou, 2002). 
Specifically, privacy is commonly defined as “the 
ability of the individual to personally control 
information about oneself” (Stone et al., 1983, p. 
460). Westin (1967) refers, in particular, to the 
possibility of data generators to determine the 
manner, scope, and time in which data are collected 
by, and transferred to, third parties. The existing IS 
studies on privacy cover a wide range of aspects and 
perspectives (Dinev et al., 2008; Malhotra et al., 
2004; Xu et al., 2011). However, despite the existing 
body of knowledge, there is a lack of actionable 
solutions, as Bélanger and Crossler (2011) conclude 
in their seminal literature review. Specifically, they 
emphasize that beyond providing conceptual 
contributions toward the privacy debate, IS research 
should “conduct design and action research with an 
eye towards actual implementation” (p. 1035), 
developing tools to protect information privacy. 
In summary, the IoT is advancing much faster than 
the related privacy and security measures and policies 
(Singh et al., 2016; Weber, 2010). The resulting 
security and privacy gaps are potentially dangerous 
loopholes that can be exploited by malicious actors to 
the detriment of consumers and organizations 
(Aggarwal et al., 2013; Lowry et al., 2017). In fact, 
the adoption of IoT solutions might depend on 
organizations’ capabilities to offer systems that 
ensure adequate security levels while guaranteeing 
sufficient user privacy (Sicari et al., 2016). As such, 
the IoT, characterized by multistage data pipelines 
and big (sensor) data, is “particularly compelling to 
security and privacy researchers” because it carries 
“innate information and privacy risks” (Lowry et al., 
2017, p. 546). 
2.3 Existing Research on SDPSs and 
Their Limitations 
SDPSs, which aim to ensure the security and privacy 
of sensor data, are the subject of an extensive body of 
literature. In particular, the IS community has made 
considerable effort to investigate issues of security and 
privacy (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Chatterjee et al., 2015; 
Chen & Zahedi, 2016), which has resulted in various 
design theories (Heikka et al., 2006; Siponen & Iivari, 
2006). A key research focus in the area of IS security 
is the use of organizational policies that define how the 
users of information systems should prevent, identify, 
and react in security incidents (Anderson et al., 2017; 
Cram et al., 2017; Moody et al., 2018; Niemimaa & 
Niemimaa, 2017). An excellent review of the body of 
knowledge is provided by Cram et al. (2017), who 
analyzed 114 security policy-related journal articles. 
From this research stream, the study of Anderson et al. 
(2017) is especially relevant for our work. They 
combine discussions of security with those of 
information privacy, focusing on the risks and rewards 
of either sharing or retaining full control over data. 
Thus, they cover a topic that is also fundamental to 
SDPSs—namely, security, privacy, and the necessity, 
or economic benefit, of sharing information. However, 
similar to the approach of other literature on 
organizational policies, Anderson et al. (2017) 
deliberately refrain from providing actionable 
guidelines for the implementation of information 
systems that would enable secure and privacy-
preserving data exchange. Rather, they focus on how 
an organization and its personnel should behave in the 
vicinity of such systems. A lack of normative results 
can be similarly observed in most other examples of IS 
research on SDPSs (Crossler & Posey, 2017). This 
finding is in line with the seminal literature review by 
Bélanger and Crossler (2011) on information privacy, 
in which the authors conclude that “very few articles 
provide design and action contributions” (p. 1023). 
Moreover, the IS literature on privacy and security 
hardly addresses the specific design challenges that 
arise when processing IoT sensor data.  
Beyond the domain of IS, there is a fruitful knowledge 
base of computer science literature that specifically 
addresses security and privacy issues in the IoT. Core 
insights from the latest research include the summation 
that “the task of affordably supporting security and 
privacy [in the IoT is] quite challenging” (Trappe et al., 
2015, p. 14) and the observation that while some 
known security principles should be adaptable to the 
IoT computing paradigm, “the nature of both physical 
processes and IoT devices lend themselves to the 
construction of new security mechanisms” (Fernandes 
et al., 2017, p. 83). Inspired by such statements, there 
has been an active stream of research developing 
specific solutions in the realm of SDPSs (Kolias et al., 
2016; Margulies, 2015; Ronen et al., 2017), including 
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work on the potential value contribution of blockchain 
technology. Ayoade, Karande, Khan, and Hamlen 
(2018), for example, present a system for the 
management of IoT data in which all permissions for 
data access are enforced by smart contracts on a 
blockchain, which also ensures traceability by the 
logging of all data access requests. Liang, Zhao, 
Shetty, and Li (2017) present a system that leverages a 
public blockchain to ensure the integrity of data 
collected by drones and additionally secures the 
communication between the drone and its control 
system. Machado and Fröhlich (2018) propose a 
system that uses blockchain technology to enable the 
verification of the data integrity of IoT devices. More 
specifically, they present a proof of concept and 
evaluate the performance of the implemented data 
pipeline. While these studies contain detailed 
descriptions of specific prototypes, they lack both the 
codifications and the abstractions of the interrelated set 
of requirements that the system needs to fulfill, as well 
as the design principles and features that address these 
requirements. Both types of research results, however, 
are necessary to allow for generalizability beyond a 
specific solution to a specific problem. The importance 
of such a thorough conceptualization has been 
extensively discussed among scholars and is a key 
aspect of DSR (Baskerville & Pries-Heje, 2010; 
Gregor & Hevner, 2013; Gregor & Jones, 2007; Meth 
et al., 2015). Therefore, we suggest that the 
contributions of these existing studies could be 
expanded substantially by reflecting state-of-the-art 
DSR guidelines and providing a thorough 
conceptualization. 
Taken together, there is a rich body of knowledge in 
the IS community on security and privacy. However, 
scholars have specifically called for studies that 
develop actionable guidelines to facilitate the design of 
practical tools. To the best of our knowledge, there are 
no examples of prior research dedicated to the design 
and actual implementation of SDPSs. Outside of the IS 
community, there is an active stream of research 
focused on the development of SDPSs, describing the 
technical design of prototypes in detail. However, 
these studies provide very specific solutions to equally 
specific problems. As such, they lack well-defined 
conceptualizations and generalizable results 
addressing an entire problem class. Finally, due to the 
novelty of blockchain technology, there has been a 
lack of reflection on the specific advantages and 
limitations of blockchain technology in SDPSs. 
2.4 Blockchain Technology 
A blockchain is a distributed transactional database 
that is cryptographically secured and controlled by a 
consensus mechanism (Beck et al., 2017). From an 
operational perspective, a blockchain comprises an 
event log storing transactions in such a way that they 
are immutable once submitted to the system (Moyano 
& Ross, 2017). Instead of storing the transactions on a 
central server, various copies of the data exist across 
different computers, otherwise known as nodes, that 
participate in the blockchain (Tschorsch & 
Scheuermann, 2016). This decentralization enables a 
distributed governance, with a “consensus mechanism 
between the participating nodes in the system” 
(Hyvärinen et al., 2017, p. 445), thus eliminating the 
need to trust other participants of the system (Egelund-
Müller et al., 2017; Nakamoto 2008; Notheisen et al., 
2017). Blockchains only accept new entries if they 
obey a predefined protocol and are thus deemed valid 
(Nærland et al., 2017; Risius & Spohrer, 2017). Since 
the introduction of the initial blockchain application 
Bitcoin in 2009, different forms of distributed ledger 
technologies, or incarnations of blockchains, have 
emerged (Lindman et al., 2017; Nakamoto, 2008). In 
the paper at hand, we focus on public permissionless 
blockchains that enable secure transactions in open 
ecosystems where the participants are not limited to 
known players, trust is not granted, and all participants 
are treated equally (Beck, Müller-Bloch, & Ling, 
2018). In addition to the generic properties outlined 
above, this blockchain type is characterized by a 
specific set of criteria. The protocols of public 
permissionless blockchains, such as Ethereum, allow 
anyone to see any transaction and every node to submit 
and validate transactions on the blockchain, “thus 
providing maximum transparency and replicability of 
transactions” (Hyvärinen et al., 2017, p. 444; 
Tschorsch & Scheuermann, 2016). Since they are open 
source, anyone can use these blockchains free of 
charge and legally (Nærland et al., 2017). In addition, 
as long as one follows the predefined protocol, there is 
no gatekeeper limiting access to the blockchain (Beck, 
Müller-Bloch, & Ling, 2018). Finally, permissionless 
blockchains are extraordinarily resistant to malicious 
attempts at manipulation, because the cryptographic 
logic driving the consensus mechanism and the storage 
of the transaction log both rely on a decentralized 
implementation (Gervais et al., 2016). Compared to 
traditional information systems, public permissionless 
blockchains “avoid the need for copious, often 
duplicate documentation, third-party intervention, and 
remediation” (Underwood, 2016, p. 15). Against this 
background, blockchain technology is often perceived 
as groundbreaking and is predicted to fundamentally 
affect how business is conducted (e.g., Chanson, 
Gjoen, Risius, & Wortmann, 2018; Gomber, 
Kauffman, Parker, & Weber, 2018), as many industries 
depend on the fact “that individuals and organizations 
trust other entities to create, store, and distribute 
essential records” (Beck et al., 2017, p. 381).  
The above-outlined blockchain properties are 
particularly useful for mitigating issues of data security 
arising in the IoT and have some decisive advantages 
over a conventional database system on central servers 
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(Bogner et al., 2016; Glaser, 2017; Hyvärinen et al., 
2017). Indeed, there are a variety of different 
blockchain-based IoT systems currently under 
development. Well-known examples address use cases 
in car leasing (Curtis, 2015), pharmaceutical supply 
chains (Modum, 2018), and energy markets (Meeuw et 
al., 2018; Mengelkamp et al., 2018). Applying 
blockchain to IoT use cases has the potential to ensure 
the “protection of critical infrastructure and data” 
(Hyvärinen et al., 2017, p. 443). More specifically, 
blockchains provide tamper-proof storage capabilities 
in the form of a distributed ledger that can be used to 
securely store IoT sensor data. In addition, they enable 
secure ledger access on the basis of well-defined 
protocols. Finally, blockchain solutions are not 
operated by one single party (Bogner et al., 2016); 
hence, they are neutral and particularly suitable in 
ecosystem settings with multiple parties and 
potentially diverging interests. However, recent 
research has often had a view of blockchain technology 
that is overly optimistic (Beck et al., 2017), and the 
core blockchain challenges in the field of IoT have yet 
to be solved. First, simply writing IoT sensor data to a 
public permissionless blockchain is an unacceptable 
practice in light of the highly sensitive IoT data that are 
gathered across all areas of our lives (Beck et al., 2017; 
Lowry et al., 2017). The specific privacy challenges 
arising in the IoT (see Lowry et al., 2017; Sicari et al., 
2015) require adequate countermeasures to ensure the 
data privacy of public permissionless blockchain-
based IoT systems (Beck et al., 2017; Fabian et al., 
2016). Second, public permissionless blockchains are 
known for their restrictions with respect to scalability 
as well as for their potentially prohibitive transaction 
costs (Beck et al., 2016; Risius & Spohrer, 2017). In 
summary, permissionless blockchain technology is a 
promising means to mitigate issues of data integrity 
and availability arising in the IoT. However, some core 
challenges, such as privacy, scalability, and the 
potentially prohibitive transaction costs, still need to be 
addressed. 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Overall Research Design 
We address the problems discussed in Section 2 
through design science research (Gregor & Jones, 
2007; March & Smith, 1995), and base our specific 
research approach on the guidelines of Peffers, 
Tuunanen, Rothenberger, and Chatterjee (2007). 
Design science has its roots in the seminal work of 
Herbert Simon (Simon 1969) and is anchored in many 
disciplines, such as engineering, architectural science, 
computer science, and economics (Baskerville, 2008; 
March & Smith, 1995). Within the IS community, the 
development of design knowledge is of high 
significance for both research and practice 
(Baskerville, 2008; Hevner et al., 2004; Winter, 2008) 
and continues to attract considerable interest 
(Baskerville et al., 2015; Gregor & Hevner, 2013; Rai, 
2017). The focus of design science is on the creation of 
the artificial and accordingly the rigorous construction 
and evaluation of innovative artifacts. It aims to generate 
new knowledge about a specific and relevant problem 
class and corresponding solutions to that problem class 
(Hevner & Chatterjee. 2010). Hence, the creation of 
utility for practical application through the resulting 
artifact is one of the core goals of design science 
research (Hevner et al.. 2004; Winter 2008). While some 
scholars put their emphasis on the artifact and its 
relevance (Hevner et al.. 2004; March & Smith, 1995), 
others stress the importance of contributions to theory 
(Gregor & Jones, 2007; Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2008; 
Walls et al., 1992). However, it is widely agreed that 
impactful design science research arises through 
synergies between relevance and rigor, that is, the 
contributions to the application environment as well as 
to theory (Gregor & Hevner, 2013). We build upon this 
understanding and elaborate in the following on both the 
role of theory as well as the general design of the 
research process. 
Concerning the role of theory, we draw on Gregor and 
Jones (2007), who extend the work of Walls, 
Widemeyer, and El Sawy (1992) and note that 
theorizing is a key goal in DSR that may culminate in 
establishing an IS design theory. On the one hand, 
existing theory can serve, in the form of kernel 
theories, as justificatory knowledge and inputs for 
design cycles (Gregor & Jones, 2007). In particular, 
the design principles derived from such kernel theories 
may guide the implementation of an artifact (Walls et 
al., 1992). On the other hand, design theorizing should 
contribute to a novel design theory with the aim of 
formalizing knowledge in DSR (Gregor & Hevner, 
2013; Gregor & Jones, 2007). This type of theory 
provides instructions that link design principles and 
features with actions. It is prescriptive in the sense that 
it provides rules and actionable guidelines and hence 
belongs to the theories of type five in Gregor’s 
taxonomy (Gregor, 2006; Gregor & Hevner, 2013). 
Communicating such a design theory can be enabled 
by an artifact instantiation that embodies the related 
design principles and features (Gregor & Jones, 2007). 
An ex post evaluation, in which additional slices of 
data are gathered after the original design cycles and 
the corresponding evaluations and are then used in an 
evaluation process to generate further theoretical 
insight, can be an important and constructive step to 
reach a sufficient abstraction level and theoretical 
saturation (Beck et al., 2013).  
Concerning the general design of the research process, 
there is wide agreement that an iterative procedure of 
well-defined steps is most applicable for DSR (Hevner 
et al., 2004; Nunamaker Jr et al., 1990; Takeda et al., 
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1990). Since the recognition of DSR in the mainstream 
of IS with the publication of Hevner et al.’s article 
(2004), the discourse within the IS community has 
been intense and ongoing regarding the specific 
structuring of this process. Many different approaches, 
improvements, and derivatives thereof have been 
suggested by renowned scholars (Beck et al., 2013; 
Hevner 2007; Peffers et al., 2007; Vaishnavi and 
Kuechler 2015). Our project’s research design is based 
on the guidelines of Peffers et al. (2007) and informed 
by the design approach of Meth et al. (2015). We 
extend Peffers et al.’s guidelines by considering an 
additional phase of ex post evaluation (Pries-Heje et 
al., 2008; Venable et al., 2016) after finalizing the 
prototype, as suggested by Beck et al. (2013), which 
facilitates the generation of additional insight. Finally, 
to summarize the knowledge gathered, we follow 
Gregor and Jones (2007) and present our results in the 
form of a design theory. 
3.2 Design Cycles 
Based on the theoretical and procedural reflections 
above, we designed our research project in three design 
cycles, each composed of five phases, followed by two 
final steps of evaluation and communication. This 
research design, the output of each phase, and the 
associated iteration between conceptualization, 
development, instantiation, and evaluation, is outlined 
in Figure 2. 
The first design cycle was initiated with an intensive 
literature review to identify the problem at hand and 
reflect on RQ1. Our examination of the topic was 
triggered by a report of the prevalence of odometer 
fraud (TÜV Rheinland, 2015). Developing systems 
that were capable of securely processing and 
exchanging odometer sensor data arose as a main 
challenge in this study. Our literature review quickly 
expanded to similar issues regarding IoT sensor data 
present in other industries, such as pharma (Modum, 
2018) and energy (Mengelkamp et al., 2018). This 
initial literature review allowed us to develop the first 
preliminary requirements for the artifact to be built. 
We then conducted a second literature review to find 
reference points in theory and the extant body of 
knowledge to refine these preliminary requirements, 
deepening the findings concerning RQ1. Based on this, 
we then derived design principles in the objective 
definition phase and identified the design features that 
were required to address these design principles, hence 
addressing RQ2. All these steps focused on the 
generalized problem class. In the next step, we 
instantiated the developed design with respect to a 
specific use case (prevention of odometer fraud) and 
developed the first version of our prototype CertifiCar. 
We evaluated this initial version of CertifiCar in a field 
test with five cars as well as on the basis of expert 
interviews. We used the results of this evaluation to 
adapt the artifact design in the second design cycle and, 
based on these changes, implemented a new version of 
our artifact. Again, we evaluated the artifact in a field 
test and on the basis of expert feedback. We integrated 
these findings into the third design cycle, which was 
run similarly to the second design cycle, resulting in 
the final version of the artifact. The final version of 
CertifiCar was deployed in a field test with 100 cars, 
and the subsequent evaluation was based on the results 
of this field test and on expert interviews. During these 
loops of development and evaluation, we iteratively 
refined the design requirements, principles, and 
features, enhancing the results of RQ1 and RQ2. 
Furthermore, the knowledge acquired in this phase 
built the foundation to approach RQ3. Ultimately, we 
gathered additional slices of data for a detailed ex post 
evaluation of the derived design requirements, 
principles, and features of the artifact (Beck et al., 
2013; Pries-Heje et al., 2008). This helped to confirm 
the validity of our responses to RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3 
and led to diverse additional insights into RQ3. 
In our conceptualization efforts, we followed three 
core design steps to derive the design requirements, 
principles, and features (Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010; 
March & Smith, 1995). In the first step, we developed 
design requirements based on the input from the 
problem identification step. The design requirements 
are generic requirements that should be met by any 
artifact aiming to create a solution for the underlying 
problem class. This notion of design requirements is 
closely related to the metarequirements described by 
Walls et al. (1992) and the general requirements 
introduced by Baskerville and Pries-Heje (2010). In 
the second design step, we identified design principles 
based on the input of the suggestion step—for instance, 
by drawing on the extant information asymmetry 
literature. Our concept of design principles 
corresponds to the generic capabilities of an artifact 
through which the design requirements are addressed 
and relates these requirements indirectly with design 
features containing the technical specifics of the 
solution. This notion of design principles is closely 
linked to the metadesign introduced by Walls et al. 
(1992) and the relationship between general 
requirements and general components that Baskerville 
and Pries-Heje (2010) emphasize. 




Figure 2. Design Cycles Based on Peffers et al. (2007), Beck et al. (2013),  
and Meth et al. (2015) 
 
In the third step, we derived design features on the 
basis of the design principles and implemented to 
instantiate the artifact. These design features capture 
the technical specifics of the solution and are closely 
related to the general components described by 
Baskerville and Pries-Heje (2010). A design principle 
that is instantiated by an explicit design feature can be 
understood as an explanation (design principle) of why 
a specified piece (design feature) leads to a predefined 
goal (design requirement) (Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 
2012). These explanations will assist us in abstracting 
the results of the instantiation of our prototype 
(CertifiCar) to a more generalized level and in creating 
a better understanding of the conceptual foundation of 
the design theory we propose. 
As we reported above, we attempted to ensure the 
appropriate grounding and viability of the proposed 
design and its corresponding artifact instantiation in 
multiple iterations of our research design. Thus, we 
distinguished between the interim evaluations at the 
end of each design cycle and the ultimate ex post 
evaluation after finalizing the artifact development. In 
practice, in each design cycle, we used the last two 
phases to demonstrate and evaluate the current 
instantiation of the prototype, as the guidelines of 
Peffers et al. (2007) suggest. This procedure is detailed 
in Section 5, where we depict the iterative 
development of the prototype and the corresponding 
demonstrations and evaluations. Subsequently, we 
perform an additional ex post evaluation (Pries-Heje et 
al., 2008), as suggested by Beck et al. (2013), to 
facilitate the generation of a novel theory. Specifically, 
we perform semistructured interviews with nine 
experts on different security and privacy topics 
 
1 Using respective combinations 
regarding IoT data to generalize and verify the viability 
of our proposed actionable guidelines, resulting in our 
final design theory. We only briefly discuss the interim 
evaluations and emphasize the ex post evaluation 
because it focuses on the generalized problem class 
defined by the design requirements derived and, 
contrary to the interim evaluations, not on the specifics 
of the prototype implemented in this study. 
4 Designing an IoT Sensor Data 
Protection System 
4.1 Developing Design Requirements 
To derive the specific design requirements for an 
SDPS that enables the process of IoT sensor data 
generation, processing, and exchange, we built upon 
practically motivated problems that are outlined in the 
existing literature. More specifically, as outlined in the 
foundations section, studies of interest include the 
following: (1) research regarding the Internet of 
Things and sensor data (core keywords: Internet of 
Things, IoT, cyberphysical systems, sensor data, big 
data, digital and digitization1), (2) research regarding 
security and privacy (core keywords: protection, 
security, secure, privacy, private, privacy-preserving, 
data, information and system1), and (3) specific 
research focusing on systems that protect sensor data 
(core keywords: Internet of Things, IoT, cyberphysical 
systems, sensor data, security, cybersecurity, attack, 
protection, privacy, private and privacy-preserving1). 
To consolidate the existing research, we considered 
prestigious IS journals (i.e., the AIS basket of 
journals), international IS conferences (AMCIS, 
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ECIS, ICIS, MCIS, PACIS), and high-quality journals 
with a specific focus on practical relevance (Harvard 
Business Review, MIS Quarterly Executive, and MIT 
Sloan Management Review). Additional IS outlets 
were considered by means of the AIS eLibrary. With 
respect to research focused on systems that protect 
sensor data, we included the ACM Digital Library, as 
well as the IEEE Xplore Digital Library. Finally, we 
conducted a backward and forward search based on 
the gathered literature (Webster & Watson, 2002). 
A core challenge in IoT is security and data 
manipulation (Lowry et al., 2017). The IoT creates 
new security challenges, for instance, that the data 
collection nodes are typically left unattended for long 
periods of time (Aggarwal et al., 2013; Ronen et al., 
2017). In addition, a data recipient cannot be sure if 
the received data is valid, because a malicious 
adversary, potentially the data owner himself, can 
potentially manipulate the data at several stages in the 
data pipeline (Aggarwal et al., 2013). Additional 
problems are introduced by the fact that the progress 
in deploying and developing the IoT is much faster 
than the accompanying security practices (Singh et al., 
2016). Therefore, a recipient of IoT sensor data often 
encounters the problem that the data integrity cannot 
be taken for granted (Miorandi et al., 2012; Sicari et 
al., 2015). Consequently, we derive the following 
design requirement:  
DR1: Enable tamper-resistant data generation, 
processing, and exchange. The process of IoT 
sensor data generation, processing, and 
exchange should be supported by systems that 
ensure tamper resistance throughout the whole 
data pipeline.  
A second challenge in the realm of IoT sensor data is 
privacy (Lee et al., 2018; Sicari et al., 2015). More 
specifically, there is a lack of well-established 
privacy-preserving mechanisms (Bélanger & 
Crossler, 2011). This is especially striking because 
IoT sensors often have access to very detailed 
personal data (Lowry et al., 2017). In addition, users 
are often not able to determine which data are 
recorded and transmitted (Davenport, 2013; Westin, 
1967). Home assistance devices, such as Amazon 
Alexa and Google Home as well as similar devices 
deployed in user homes, are always on, although they 
are generally not supposed to store or transmit 
recorded information.. Therefore, an important goal of 
any data processing system in the realm of IoT is to 
preserve privacy (Alqassem & Svetinovic, 2014; 
Sicari et al., 2016). Consequently, we derive the 
following design requirement:  
DR2: Enable privacy-preserving data generation, 
processing, and exchange. The process of IoT 
sensor data generation, processing, and 
exchange should be supported by systems that 
are capable of preserving the privacy of the 
corresponding data owner. 
A third challenge is related to IoT and big data. As we 
have outlined, the technical transformation of 
information processing from analog to digital and the 
associated merger of the physical and digital worlds 
are expected to generate unprecedented amounts of 
data (Lowry et al., 2017; Porter & Heppelmann, 
2015). Hence, systems that enable tamper-resistant 
data generation and exchange must be able to cope 
with “big data” (Chen et al., 2012). To operate in such 
a context, corresponding systems should have 
sufficient throughput to handle the expected amounts 
of data generated by the IoT. This aspect becomes 
particularly relevant when using blockchain 
technology, as many of the existing blockchain 
technologies are still struggling with scalability 
problems (Hyvärinen et al., 2017; Tschorsch & 
Scheuermann, 2016). Consequently, we derive the 
following design requirement:  
DR3: Enable large data volume throughput. The 
process of IoT sensor data generation, 
processing, and exchange should be supported 
by systems capable of processing the large 
amounts of data that are typical for IoT 
applications. 
Finally, the advantages of information systems must 
always be weighed against their disadvantages 
(Delone & McLean, 2003). In light of this 
fundamental economic principle, the IS-related costs 
are of particular importance in a business 
environment. Although this holds true for any IS, it is 
of special importance for solutions that rely on 
blockchain technology (Risius & Spohrer, 2017). As 
discussed above, the currently unsolved issues 
regarding the scalability of different blockchain 
technologies and high transaction costs have the 
potential to generate substantial financial 
expenditures (Beck et al., 2016; Hyvärinen et al., 
2017). Consequently, we derive the following design 
requirement: 
DR4: Ensure economic feasibility. The process of 
IoT sensor data generation, processing, and 
exchange should be supported by systems that 
ensure economic feasibility. 
Summing up, based on the fundamental SDPS 
challenges, we derived four general design 
requirements (see Table 1). These design 
requirements determine our design theory’s purpose 
and scope that the design principles and design 
features must address to overcome or reduce the 
existing challenges (see Figure 3). 
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 Table 1: General SDPS Challenges and Design Requirements 
ID SDPS challenge SDPS design requirement Main corresponding literature 
1 
Adversaries have the possibility to 
manipulate sensor data at several stages 
in the processing pipeline, so data 
integrity cannot be taken for granted. 
SDPS should ensure tamper resistance 
throughout the whole data pipeline. 
Aggarwal et al., 2013; Lowry et al., 
2017; Sicari et al., 2015 
2 
IoT sensors can capture detailed and 
very sensitive personal data. 
SDPS should be capable of preserving 
the privacy of the data owner. 
Bélanger and Crossler 2011; Davenport 
2013; Lee et al., 2018; Sicari et al., 
2016 
3 
IoT sensors are able to generate vast 
amounts of data. 
SDPS should provide sufficient data 
throughput to process large amounts of 
data. 
Chen et al., 2012; Hyvärinen et al., 
2017; Porter and Heppelmann 2015) 
4 
The protection of IoT sensor data can 
require substantial resources and 
induce significant costs. 
SDPS should ensure economic 
feasibility, that is, the protection 
benefits have to outweigh the 
protection costs. 
Beck et al., 2016; Hyvärinen et al., 
2017; Risius and Spohrer 2017) 
4.2 Deriving Design Principles 
To address the design requirements, we build upon 
theory and the existing body of knowledge to derive 
design principles. With respect to DR1 (tamper-resistant 
data generation, processing, and exchange), theory of 
information asymmetry provides a fruitful basis to 
derive design principles. The (neo)classical market 
model suggests that participants are fully informed 
about all goods (Albersmeier et al., 2009). However, 
business transactions are often characterized by 
fundamental information deficits (information 
asymmetries) that favor opportunistic behavior and 
restrict the smooth functioning of markets (Akerlof 
1970; Spence 1976). To overcome these information 
deficits and avoid opportunistic behavior, certain 
measures such as certification, guarantees, or well-
established brand names have been identified (Akerlof, 
1970; Bond, 1982; Genesove, 1993). 
With regard to the protection of sensor data, 
certification, in particular, appears to be a suitable 
measure to prevent opportunistic behavior 
(manipulation), as it is not restricted to companies that 
have high credibility or a strong brand name. 
Certification indicates the attainment of a certain quality 
level and is based on auditing (Akerlof, 1970). It most 
often relies on protection and investigation schemes that 
cover the whole supply (e.g., food business) chain or 
information (e.g., financial auditing) chain, as certain 
product and information qualities cannot be judged by 
inspections that are limited to the end of the chain 
(Albersmeier et al., 2009). This is particularly relevant 
for sensor data. Only in the case of very obvious 
manipulations is it possible to detect manipulated sensor 
data by means of a single inspection at a certain point in 
the information processing chain (e.g., when the 
odometer value of a car is equal to or even smaller than 
 
2 https://patents.google.com/patent/DE10228648A1/de 
zero). Hence, the entire information chain from source 
(sensor) to sink (final data consumer) must be protected 
from manipulation, e.g., by applying an appropriate 
means of encryption. By protecting the data along the 
entire information chain, it can be certified that the data 
were not manipulated on the way from the source to the 
sink. 
DP1: Sensor data are certified on the basis of source-to-
sink protection. 
If data are protected from source to sink, data producers 
can be made accountable for the data they provide. 
However, in the case of sensor data, even if the 
information chain is protected from source to sink, data 
manipulation can still occur. More specifically, the data 
producer can focus on the source and manipulate the 
sensor or its environment. For example, anecdotal 
evidence and a corresponding patent 2  suggest that 
temperature sensors in cold chains are regularly covered 
with insulation material to hide shorter periods of 
irregularities. In cars, as a second example, mileage 
sensors (odometers) are multicomponent systems that 
are connected by cables so that manipulating devices 
(“CAN filters,” “CAN blockers”) can be placed between 
them. More specifically, small sensing units often do not 
have the computing power for encryption or processing 
and hence communicate their raw sensor values to more 
powerful control units over wires that can be 
intercepted. Therefore, sensors are not per se monolithic 
components that are well protected and cannot be 
manipulated. To account for the corresponding 
manipulation risk, additional means might be required 
to enable trustworthy certification. More specifically, 
cross-validation and plausibility checks are common 
auditing means (Whittington & Pany, 2015) that might 
also be used with sensor data to reveal manipulations. In 
the case of car mileage manipulation, for example, GPS 
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data can be used to cross-validate the mileage data of a 
car.  
DP2: Sensor data is certified on the basis of cross-
validation. 
However, cross-validation and plausibility checks can 
only reduce the risk of manipulation. Similar to financial 
auditing, a “detection risk” (Dong et al., 2018; Hogan & 
Wilkins, 2008) remains, which depicts the probability 
that manipulations are not detected. In summary, with 
the implementation of DP1, it can be certified that data 
were not manipulated on their way from the source to 
the sink, so that data producers can be made accountable 
for the data they provide. In addition, with the 
availability of cross-validation data and the 
implementation of DP2, it can be certified with an 
associated detection risk that the sensor or its 
environment were not manipulated. 
With regard to DR2 (privacy-preserving data 
generation, processing, and exchange), we build upon 
Westin’s (1967) theory of privacy to derive a 
corresponding design principle. Westin’s theory is one 
of the best-articulated and best-supported theories of 
privacy (Margulis, 2011). A fundamental cornerstone of 
Westin’s theory is the existence of the following four 
states of privacy (Margulis, 2011): (1) solitude is about 
being free from observation by others, (2) intimacy is 
about the seclusion required to form close associations, 
(3) anonymity is about the condition of being unknown, 
and (4) reserve is about limiting disclosure to others. In 
essence, for Westin (1967, p. 7) privacy “is the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others.” 
At the core of Westin’s definition is the right of a data 
owner to have full control over the communication and 
use of his or her data. With respect to the exchange of 
sensor data, the data owner should therefore determine 
when and to what extent data is communicated and to 
whom. However, the means of exchange that 
determines the “how” is a software system. Hence, the 
data owner is limited in privacy by the restrictions of the 
system. If the system restricts privacy too much, though, 
the data owner still has the option to not use the system. 
In summary, in the context of sensor data exchange, we 
derive the following design principle that addresses 
DR2:  
DP3: Data owners determine when and to what extent 
their certified data is communicated to others. 
While the first two design requirements focus on what a 
sensor data exchange system should enable (tamper 
resistance and privacy), DR3 (large data volume 
throughput) and DR4 (economic feasibility) further 
qualify how the system should operate (scalable and 
thereby also cost efficient) and shift the focus from 
positive system outcomes (prevent manipulation, ensure 
privacy) to possible negative outcomes (system costs). 
The existence of such positive and negative system 
outcomes is well reflected in IS theory. The DeLone and 
McLean model of information systems success captures 
the idea that the system impact has to reflect the balance 
of positive and negative impacts (Delone & McLean, 
2003). The concept of “net benefits” depicts the 
rationale that “no outcome is wholly positive, without 
any negative consequences” (Delone & McLean, 2003, 
p. 22).  
Applying the aforementioned rationale to tamper-
resistant sensor data exchange, a potential solution must 
ensure that the positive effects are not canceled out by 
negative consequences. Regarding the design challenge 
at hand, the protection and certification of IoT sensor 
data can be resource-intensive and costly, especially in 
the context of large amounts of sensor data (Sicari et al., 
2015). Hence, data must be processed on a system 
architecture that is linearly scalable with respect to 
performance and costs. As such, scalability captures 
how “well a particular solution fits a problem as the 
scope of that problem increases” (Schlossnagle, 2006). 
Linear scalability is an established concept that refers to 
the relationship between an input (e.g., amount of sensor 
data) and an output (e.g., performance or cost) (Bonvin, 
2012). While the term defines a very specific type of 
relationship (linear), it is often used in a broader sense. 
In contrast to negative or sublinear scalability (Williams 
& Smith, 2004), linear scalability depicts the idea that 
the performance does not erode and the costs of a system 
do not explode at scale.  
DP4: Data are certified on the basis of a linearly scalable 
system architecture. 
4.3 Mapping Design Principles to Design 
Features 
In the last step of the conceptualization, we mapped the 
identified design principles to design features. As we 
elaborate above, the design features are specific artifact 
capabilities designed to fulfill the design principles 
derived previously (Meth et al., 2015). An overview of 
these features, including the design principles and 
design requirements that we derived, is shown in Figure 
3. The design features that we describe build on the 
fundamental premises (see Section 2.4) that (1) 
permissionless blockchain technology is a fruitful 
means to address the issues of data security and privacy 
arising in the IoT, and (2) the limitations of the existing 
blockchain technology, with respect to privacy, 
scalability, and costs, have to be addressed 
appropriately. In the following discussion, we introduce 
the design features along with three fundamental system 
capabilities: capturing data, storing data, and providing 
data. 
To implement the first design principle, that is, certify 
that the data were not manipulated on the way from the 
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source to the sink, two features are needed. First, we 
have to collect the data (DF1) and, second, we need to 
preprocess the data in a way that prevents data 
manipulation from this point on (DF3). To achieve this, 
we follow existing practices (Ayoade et al., 2018; 
Nærland et al., 2017) and save only the hash of the data 
(i.e., the “digital fingerprint” of the data) in a public 
permissionless blockchain. We can later use this hash to 
check that the data, which are stored in raw format in a 
traditional database, have not been changed by other 
parties since the transaction was signed. As only 
changes after the signature can be detected by this 
approach, it is essential to choose the earliest possible 
point in the data pipeline to create this signature and 
swiftly add the transaction to a blockchain. 
The second design principle of cross-validation-based 
certification calls for two additional design features— 
namely, the collection of appropriate validation data 
(DF2) and a certification mechanism that performs the 
cross-validation (DF8). In the case of car mileage data, 
for example, GPS data can be collected for validation 
purposes in addition to odometer values. The GPS data 
can then be used to calculate the mileage data, which can 
be compared to the mileage values received from the 
odometer sensor.  
The third design principle postulates that data owners 
determine when and to what extent their data are 
communicated to others, which results in the 
implementation of two design features: namely, an 
access management service (DF7) and a data retrieval 
service (DF9). The access management service ensures 
that the raw data, which are stored in an encrypted form 
in a centralized mass storage system, can only be 
decrypted by the data owner. The data retrieval service 
is implemented in such a way that, in accordance with 
the access management settings, only selected parts of 
the whole raw data can be transferred to the data-
requesting party. Hence, in the odometer example, the 
data owner has the possibility to choose between only 
sharing the last odometer value or providing the full 
history of odometer values, e.g., in the form of a daily, 
weekly, or monthly history. The fourth design principle, 
requiring a linearly scalable system architecture, needs 
three more design features—namely, a storage service 
(DF4) that writes into the raw data storage (DF5) and 
also into an independent verification storage system 
(DF6). In practice, the storage service saves the 
encrypted raw data in the cloud and propagates the 
signed transaction with the hash to the blockchain 
network. By implementing these three features, a 
“hybrid architecture” that addresses a central challenge 
of public permissionless blockchain technology is 
realized. It is well known that certain public 
permissionless blockchain technologies have severe 
technical and economic scalability issues, so that 
dedicated approaches must be applied (Beck et al., 2016; 
Notheisen et al., 2017; Risius & Spohrer, 2017). More 
specifically, hybrid architectures that build upon 
blockchain-based “on-chain” transactions and non-
blockchain-based “off-chain” transactions are known to 
cope with large amounts of data while preserving the 
key characteristics of distributed blockchain systems 
(Zyskind et al., 2015). In hybrid architectures, not all 
data are made available on a fully distributed 
blockchain. Instead, some data are stored centrally or 
shared only by a selected number of nodes. However, to 
enable trust and prevent manipulation, off-chain data 
have to be linked to on-chain transactions. In the case of 
IoT sensor data, sensor values can be stored in a central 
repository, and only the digital fingerprint (hash) of one 
or multiple records is recorded on-chain. Thereby, the 
data stored in the blockchain can dramatically be 
reduced while still ensuring data integrity. 
 
 
Figure 3. Design Requirements, Principles, and Features 






Figure 4. Artifact Architecture 
 
To summarize, Figure 4 presents a general architecture 
for an SDPS, including all of the design features 
introduced above. In practice, different instantiations 
of this architecture are possible. In some cases, for 
example, the collected data themselves might not be 
privacy-relevant, and thus a selected retrieval thereof 
would not be necessary (DF7, DF9). In other cases, the 
validation data might be publicly available or may 
even have to be gathered manually by inspections, 
which would replace the validation sensor (DF2). 
The architecture highlights that a sensor is not 
necessarily a monolithic component and that the data, 
which are preprocessed and incorporated in a 
blockchain transaction as a hash (DF3), have already 
been processed through several steps as follows: they 
are recorded by a sensing unit, then processed by a 
computational unit into meaningful information, and 
finally communicated to a receiver outside of the 
sensor through a communication unit. Hence, there are 
several attack vectors between the sensing unit of a 
sensor and the location where the blockchain 
transaction is actually signed. One important goal, 
therefore, is to build and sign the blockchain 
transaction (DF3) as close as possible to the sensing 
unit. In the future, one could imagine blockchain-
enabled hardware combining sensing and transaction 
management within one chip, similar to current 
hardware security modules. This would significantly 
reduce the attack vectors and ease the implementation 
of DP1. Storing only a hash in the blockchain supports 
several goals, in addition to the main objective of 
guaranteeing the immutability of the stored data. As 
opposed to storing the raw data in the blockchain, 
using only a hash additionally prohibits other 
participants from gaining useful, potentially privacy-
related information, as the blockchain is public and 
accessible to everyone (DP3). Furthermore, the hash 
serves to reduce the amount of data that needs to be 
stored on the blockchain and therefore supports the 
scalability of the solution (DP4). 
The details of the certification mechanism and its 
individual steps (DF8) are outlined in Figure 5. The 
process is initiated by the owner of the data granting 
access (DF7). The raw dataset is decrypted and sent to 
the unit responsible for the certification (8.a). In the 
next step, the hashes of each raw data package (hashes 
can be calculated on the basis of single or multiple 
values) are calculated and stored (8.b). In parallel, for 
each raw data package, the corresponding transaction 
is looked up in the blockchain (8.c), and the saved hash 
is extracted (8.d). Then, the algorithm compares the 
hashes calculated from the raw data with those 
retrieved from the blockchain (8.e). A match proves 
that the data package in question was not changed since 
the signature of the corresponding blockchain 
transaction. Hence, the data were not manipulated on 
their way through the processing pipeline, and the data 
owner can be made accountable for the data. Any 
mismatches are noted and inserted as warnings in the 
final certificate. In the next step, the data consistency 
is verified (8.f). Here, the verification logic depends on 
given domain rules and constraints. In the case of 




Figure 5. A Detailed View of the Certification Process 
 
mileage data, for example, verification can be based on 
the simple fact that the odometer value increases with 
every trip; a decrease in mileage is thus a clear 
indicator of an irregularity or manipulation. Typically, 
the more interdependent the sensor values that are 
recorded, the more sophisticated the tests are that can 
be applied. In the final step of the verification, the 
validation data can be leveraged (8.g). In the case of 
odometer fraud, the increase in the mileage of a trip 
should, for example, be larger or equal to the shortest 
distance between the GPS coordinates of the start and 
the end of the trip (data that are now available in 
connected cars). Finally, the certificate is issued, either 
without restrictions, if all verification steps were 
passed successfully (8.h.i), or with restrictions and a 
detailed report on the issues (8.h.ii). 
5 Iterative Development of the 
Prototype 
One of the core goals of design science research is to 
create utility for practitioners. To succeed in this task, 
practitioners must understand how to apply the abstract 
guidelines developed in the design science research 
process. As the implementation of such abstract 
guidelines is inherently ambiguous, scholars 
recommend describing the implementations of these 
guidelines, including the corresponding context, in 
detail, and positioning the artifact in a natural setting, 
thus rendering these guidelines actionable 
(Baskerville, 2008; Chandra Kruse et al., 2015, 2016). 
Additionally, these descriptions enable researchers to 
establish the instantiation validity of the 
implementation by showing how the abstract 
guidelines can be linked to specific features of an 
artifact (Lukyanenko et al., 2015). Hence, in the 
following, we present the iterative problem-solving 
process used to design and develop our prototype 
CertifiCar.  
The aim of our prototype is to prevent odometer fraud. 
Odometer fraud prevention is a relevant IoT use case 
in which the integrity of data is of high value and 
privacy is desirable. Odometer fraud, i.e., the 
fraudulent manipulation of a car’s mileage records, is 
a huge problem in many countries, which is why 
numerous governments—for example, in Belgium, 
New Zealand, and the USA—have fostered the 
creation of systems that impede manipulation using the 
threat of legal repercussions (Car-Pass, 2018; Carfax, 
2018; CarJam, 2018). Germany is one of the largest car 
markets without a centralized prevention system, and 
it is estimated that odometer fraud in Germany affects 
one third of all resold cars, leading to annual losses of 
almost 6 billion euros (TÜV Rheinland, 2015). 
Usually, odometer fraud is committed in order to 
increase a car’s value by reducing the mileage. The 
procedure is extremely simple and inexpensive and can 
be performed within minutes. Detailed step-by-step 
instructions are available on YouTube, and 
corresponding devices can be ordered online for less 
than 100 euros.  
The existing systems that fight odometer fraud, such as 
Carfax (USA) and CarJam (NZ), are up against several 
substantial challenges. For example, they remain 
unable to reliably detect odometer fraud, they are 
plagued with severe privacy issues, and they cannot 
support cross-country transactions. More specifically, 
new records are only captured occasionally, and the 
interval between two records can span months or even 
years, giving rise to considerable fraud potential. In 
addition, there is no cross-validation. This makes it 
very difficult to detect odometer fraud. Moreover, 
continuous odometer fraud enabled by specific 
hardware manipulation devices within the car cannot 
be detected at all. Finally, sensitive data are stored in 
central databases accessible to the public, and data 
acquisition is limited to the country of the respective 
service provider. The privacy problems in the 
approaches of the existing systems prohibit their 
application in countries with strict privacy laws, such 
as Germany. 




Figure 6. Prototype Architecture 
 
5.1 Iteration 1: End-to-End Processing 
and Initial Verification 
An overview of the prototype architecture in its final 
state is displayed in Figure 6. In the first iteration, we 
implemented an initial version of the end-to-end data 
pipeline. This included the recording of the odometer 
data in the car (DF1), the processing of these data in 
the application (DF3, DF4), and the subsequent storing 
of the encrypted raw data and hashes in a private cloud 
account (DF5) and on the blockchain (DF6), 
respectively. 
We chose the Ethereum blockchain because it offered 
the best development support and a vibrant ecosystem 
at the time we were developing the prototype in early 
2017 (Buterin 2013). As a proof of principle, we used 
the public Ethereum blockchain for a set of 
transactions. In addition to individual sample 
transactions on the Ethereum MainNet, we set up a 
private instance of the Ethereum blockchain 
exclusively devoted to our prototype. At the time of 
writing, the system had been in operation for over a 
year with only short interruptions. Additionally, a first 
version of the verification process (DF8) had also been 
implemented. This ensured that all data points were 
protected by a corresponding hash in the blockchain 
and had not been manipulated (DF8.e). The 
verification process investigated if the mileage 
decreased at any point in time (DF8.f). To interact with 
the system seamlessly, we added a web-based user 
 
3 For details, please see Appendix, Figure A-1 
interface.3 We chose to record the data points on the 
trip level to ensure reasonable transaction costs while 
guaranteeing a resolution high enough to reliably 
detect fraud. 
Every iteration of the creative and heuristic design as a 
search process should generate a representation of the 
artifact that is being demonstrated and evaluated 
(Hevner et al., 2004; Peffers et al., 2007). We tested 
this iteration with five cars that were driven daily for 
several hours for two weeks. This indicated that the 
prototype could run without any major issues. 
A sample Ethereum transaction of the prototype at this 
stage, written onto the public blockchain, is shown in 
Figure 7 and Figure 8. Figure 7 shows the view of the 
transaction in the JavaScript command line interface of 
the geth client, the official Go implementation of the 
Ethereum protocol. Please note that the hash of the 
sensor data is labeled “input,” while the value depicted 
as “hash” is the hash value of the overall blockchain 
transaction. In the example at hand, the corresponding 
transaction is the first transaction (“transactionIndex”) 
in the 2,806,957th block (“blockNumber”). To prove 
that the transaction was submitted to the Ethereum 
MainNet, Figure 8 shows a view from etherscan.io, in 
which the stored hash can be seen (“Input Data”). 
For this Ethereum transaction, Figure 9 shows the 
verification process at that point in time and how it 
links to the respective design feature (DF8) and its 




Figure 7. Sample Ethereum Transaction Retrieved with a Local Instance of the geth Client 
 
subprocesses. Note that, at this stage of the prototype, 
the cross-validation (DF8.g, see Figure 5) had not yet 
been implemented. 
Finally, we conducted a series of workshops and 
semistructured interviews with automotive and 
information technology (IT) industry experts. This 
revealed that a special case of so-called “continuous 
odometer fraud,” previously unknown to us, was 
impossible to detect using the existing system. In the 
case of continuous odometer fraud, the mileage of the 
car is continuously recorded at a lower-than-actual 
rate, i.e., only a certain percentage of the mileage 
actually driven is added to the odometer, for example, 
80%. This is achieved by installing additional 
hardware, a so-called “CAN filter,” in the car. Such 
odometer filters are readily available on the Internet, 
for example, on eBay, for less than 50 USD. Our 
solution after this first iteration, however, only focused 
on odometer mileage reduction as a means of revealing 
potential fraud; a mileage increase at a lower rate could 
not be captured as fraudulent behavior. We addressed 
this issue in our next iteration by adding a cross-
validation feature (DF2, DF8.g). 
5.2 Iteration 2: Cross-Validation and 
Scalability 
To address the problem of continuous odometer fraud, 
we leveraged GPS data (start and end coordinates of a 
trip) in the second iteration (DF2). An earlier basic 
version of this architecture was presented by Chanson 
et al. (2017). To use the GPS data to enhance fraud 
prevention, the verification process needed a 
substantial update. In addition to verifying the increase 
of the odometer value, we also checked that the trip 
distance calculated on the basis of the odometer 
mileage exceeded the distance between the GPS points 
from the start and the end of the trip (DF8.g). 
Furthermore, we addressed the scalability of the 
solution in this iteration (DP4). The internal processes 
of the application were optimized and structured by 
several queues to enable the fault-tolerant processing 
of data from a larger fleet of cars (for details, please 
see Appendix, Figure A-2). For the evaluation of this 
iteration, 100 cars were deployed in a field test. These 
cars were supplied by one of the leading German car 
manufacturers, whom we contacted for the evaluation 
of the initial iteration of the prototype. Supplying the 
whole fleet with dongles would have been very costly 
and out of the scope of this study, which is why, as of 
this iteration, the data were routed over the internal 
backend of the car manufacturer, where they were sent 
directly by the connected cars used for the field test. 
This version of the prototype was tested over twelve 
weeks with 100 cars that were used on a daily basis. 
We also conducted another series of workshops and 
interviews. The test revealed that the processing and 
verification of the enriched dataset, including the GPS 
values, worked as intended. By manipulating the 
sensor data from the administrator interface, the usage 
of odometer filters was simulated. The cross-validation 
procedure thus reliably detected the simulated 
continuous odometer fraud. Even minor manipulations 
(e.g., a continuous reduction in the mileage by 10%) 
could be consistently identified after 15 trips. 
The evaluation also revealed stability problems with the 
underlying infrastructure, specifically regarding the 
Ethereum integration. Issues such as clients losing 
connection to the blockchain network or cloud servers 
running out of storage could easily be fixed. Other 
problems were more severe. For example, the Ethereum 
client responded to the sending of a signed transaction 
to the blockchain network with a valid transaction hash, 
even if the transaction itself had not necessarily been 
successfully processed by the network. Thus, additional 
logic was necessary to ensure that a transaction had 
successfully been processed by the blockchain network. 
These issues were addressed in a third iteration, leading 
to the final prototype.  
 





Figure 8. Transaction of Figure 7 on etherscan.io with the Ether Price at the Time of the Transaction 
 
 
Figure 9. First Implementation of the Verification Process (Hashes in ASCII Format to Increase 
Readability) 
 




Figure 10. The Main Screens of the Smartphone Application 
 
5.3 Iteration 3: Stability and Usability 
In the third iteration, we addressed the stability 
problems observed in the evaluation step of the second 
iteration and implemented a smartphone app for end 
users to interact with the CertifiCar system. We 
improved the stability of the system with several 
measures. First, we started relevant processes via a 
daemon to ensure their uptime and introduced an 
additional queue4 to check that a transaction had been 
successfully inserted in the blockchain. Additionally, 
we set up an infrastructure monitoring tool (Nagios) to 
reduce the response time to system problems.  
To improve the usability, we provided a smartphone 
app, shown in Figure 10, which includes an overview 
screen and a history of the driven distance, as well as a 
screen that allows for the creation of a certificate that 
can be sent to the receiving party via email. The 
smartphone application and, in particular, the process 
of creating a certificate, was tested by a focus group of 
16 people. The feedback led to a simpler design, 
specifically with respect to data sharing and 
certification. The data owner has the option to share 
only the current odometer value, for example, with a 
potential buyer so that no detailed car-usage data are 
revealed. However, data owners might want to share 
historic data to increase trust and, ultimately, the sales 
price. Therefore, they can also share the odometer 
history on a monthly, weekly, or daily basis. 
Overall, the final iteration resulted in a prototype with 
increased stability and intuitive interaction through the 
smartphone application. The robustness and user 
reception were encouraging, resulting in the final 
clearance for a larger field test. 
 
4 For details, please see Appendix, Figure A-2 
5.4 Prototype Evaluation 
We continuously evaluated the implementation against 
practical results from an accompanying field test that 
eventually consisted of data from 100 cars as well as 
expert feedback from workshops and semistructured 
interviews. Overall, we held six workshops between 
December 2016 and September 2017, each comprising 
2-6 experts and 3-4 four researchers (in total, 22 
evaluators participated) and lasting 3-5 hours. 
Additionally, we interviewed sixteen experts between 
January and August 2017 for 45-60 minutes each. We 
prompted the participants for specific feedback and 
related it to corresponding design decisions in order to 
adapt the design principles and features. Among the 
experts participating in the workshops and interviews 
were engineers from a German car manufacturer, a 
data protection law expert from a German car 
manufacturer, specialists from a German technical 
certification provider, an online car sales platform 
CEO, and engineers from a German car supplier. We 
present an overview of the evaluation in Table 2. 
6 Ex Post Evaluation of the Design 
The scope of the evaluation in DSR reaches beyond the 
question of whether an artifact works and fulfills the 
design requirements proposed. Additionally, DSR 
should thoroughly explore how and why an artifact 
works (Pries-Heje et al., 2008). Therefore, we 
conducted an additional ex post evaluation (Beck et al., 
2013; Pries-Heje et al., 2008) to address these 
questions and to investigate to what extent the 
proposed guidelines are actionable and help to create a 
solution for the underlying problem class.  
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Table 2: Overview and Summary of the Prototype Evaluation 





• Initial end-to-end prototype 
• First implementation of 
verification process to detect 
odometer fraud 
• GPS-based cross-validation to 
address continuous odometer 
fraud 
• Queue management for 
scalability and reliability 
• Transaction queue to ensure 
reliable blockchain transaction 
processing 
• Smartphone app for end users 
Evaluation 
• Focus on fraud detection, 
scalability, and reliability 
• Field test with 5 cars, 5 
interviews and 2 workshops 
(lasting 3.5 and 4.5 hours and 
with 2 and 5 participants, 
respectively) 
• Focus on continuous odometer 
fraud detection, scalability, and 
reliability 
• Field test with 100 cars and 
simulated continuous odometer 
fraud, 7 interviews and 2 
workshops (4 hours / 3 
individuals each) 
• Focus on smartphone 
application, particularly the 
process of certificate creation, 
and system reliability 
• Field test with 100 cars and a 
focus group of 16 people, 4 
interviews and 2 workshops 
(lasting 4 and 3 hours and 
including 6 and 3 individuals, 
respectively) 
Core results 
• Initial verification procedure 
detects odometer reductions but 
not continuous odometer fraud 
• Limited scalability and fault 
tolerance 
• Cross-validation procedure 
reliably detects continuous 
odometer fraud  
• Successful blockchain 
transaction processing is not 
guaranteed, occasional loss of 
transactions 
• Stable prototype 
• Well-accepted smartphone app 
• Clearance for larger field test 
 
In addition to the case of odometer fraud that we 
investigated in detail to develop our artifact, we 
included two other use cases for this ex post evaluation 
in order to go beyond a single prototype evaluation and 
gear the evaluation more toward the overall problem 
class. As suggested by Beck et al. (2013), to reach a 
higher level of abstraction, we collected additional 
slices of data and discussed the viability of our 
proposed guidelines with a purposive group of domain 
experts. Therefore, we selected two additional cases 
featuring IoT sensor data protection that are also 
discussed extensively as fruitful blockchain use 
cases—namely, supply chain management 
(Pilkington, 2016; Tian, 2016; Underwood, 2016) and 
energy microgrids (Imbault et al., 2017; Mengelkamp 
et al., 2018; Münsing et al., 2017). The first case relates 
to cold chains, where the temperature along the supply 
chain must stay within a certain range (Modum, 2018). 
In the second case, we considered an energy microgrid 
with participating consumers and prosumers, in which 
it is essential to protect smart meter readings for a well-
functioning peer-to-peer market (Exergy, 2017a, 
2017b). 
Since we had already developed a real-world 
instantiation of an artifact for the odometer fraud case, 
we were already in contact with several experts from 
the automotive and IT certification industries. These 
relations helped us to recruit a purposive sample of 
interview participants (Miles & Huberman, 1994; 
Robinson, 2014) with expertise in the IoT domain, 
including dedicated experts on subjects such as IoT 
sensor systems, blockchain technology, odometer 
fraud, supply chain management, and energy 
microgrids (see Table 3). We conducted a total of nine 
interviews (three per use case: odometer, cold chain, 
and microgrid), each of which lasted 45-70 minutes 
(four face-to-face and five via phone). The 
conversations were semistructured, fully recorded, 
transcribed, and analyzed. We opted for the format of 
semistructured interviews to decrease the risk of 
biasing participants by asking for concrete answers and 
to allow more freedom of expression, especially since 
the interviewees often had more expertise in the 
specific subject matter than the interviewer (Myers & 
Newman, 2007; Wengraf, 2001). Below, we provide 
evidence from the transcripts of the nine interviews 
regarding the efficacy of the proposed design 
principles and corresponding features to address the 
design requirements defining our problem class. 
DP1: Sensor data are certified on the basis of source-
to-sink protection. 
A majority of the participants deemed DP1 to be of 
“utmost importance” (PM BC, Manufacturing; BC Sol 
Arch, Energy; Certification Expert, Inspection) or even 
“the most important” (BC Dev, Manufacturing; PM 
Innovation, Automotive), independent of the use case. 
One participant mentioned that DP1’s 
“implementation applies to all use cases” and that DP1 
is a “necessary basis to guarantee the validity of sensor 
data” (BC Dev, Manufacturing). 
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Table 3: Ex Post Evaluation Interview Participants 
Participant name Role Industry Case  








BC Sol Arch, Energy Blockchain solution architect Energy Energy 
PM BC, Energy Project manager blockchain Energy Energy 
BC Dev, Software  Blockchain developer Software consulting Supply chain 
Sol Arch, Automotive Solution architect Automotive Automotive 
PM Innovation, Automotive Project manager innovation Automotive Supply chain 




Certification Expert, Inspection Certification expert 




However, interviewees agreed (BC Dev, 
Manufacturing; BC Sol Arch, Energy; PM BC, 
Energy; BC Dev, Software Consulting; PM 
Innovation, Automotive) that “in practice, it is difficult 
to comply 100%” with the DP. With regard to future 
developments, it was articulated that the 
implementation of DP1 could become easier, for 
example, “if sensors can communicate directly with 
the blockchain” (PM Innovation, Automotive) or at 
least “sign transactions” (BC Dev, Manufacturing). 
One participant additionally noted that for a scalable 
solution “a sensor that is able to sign transactions 
would be sufficient” (BC Dev, Manufacturing), 
although a sensor that is able to directly communicate 
(bidirectionally) with the blockchain “would open 
fascinating new possibilities, as it could directly 
interact with smart contracts and, instead of a one-way 
communication, a dialogue could be realized” (BC 
Dev, Manufacturing), which would allow the sensor to 
also receive coins and instructions from the 
blockchain. 
Many interviewees expect blockchain-enabled 
hardware (BC Dev, Manufacturing; PM BC, 
Manufacturing; PM Innovation, Automotive)—for 
example, “sensors similar to hardware security 
modules” (PM BC, Manufacturing) that ease the 
implementation of DP1—to be available in the future. 
However, one participant noted that “currently, the 
software specifications of blockchains [e.g., of 
signature algorithms] are still evolving [and therefore] 
the development of sensor ASICs still has to wait” (BC 
Dev, Manufacturing). The advantage of application-
specific integrated circuits (ASICs) would, rather, lie 
in a “more energy-efficient processing than in 
increased speed” (BC Dev, Manufacturing). While the 
implementation specifics are expected to change, the 
“basic concept of blockchains as a record of an 
immutable shared truth” will not, and thus the usage of 
blockchain transactions as in DF3 to fulfill DP1 
“should continue to make sense” (BC Sol Arch, 
Energy). 
While generally source-to-sink protection through a 
blockchain transaction was appreciated as a sound 
measure to hinder data tampering, several participants 
agreed (BC Dev, Manufacturing; Certification Expert, 
Inspection) that there “will probably never be a way to 
ensure a completely tamper-proof solution” (PM 
Innovation, Automotive). For example, “one could 
simply manipulate the [sensor environment]—in the 
case of a cold chain, for example, by putting a cooling 
element or ice on top of the temperature sensor” (BC 
Dev, Manufacturing). One participant concluded that 
“while it makes sense to aim for a tamper-proof 
solution, it is sufficient to ensure tamper resistance that 
is strong enough to make it economically unprofitable 
to commit fraud, similar to proof of work [a blockchain 
mining mechanism]” (PM Innovation, Automotive), 
which is in line with DR1. Overall, DP1 and its 
implementation (corresponding design features) were 
strongly supported by all nine interviewees, and the 
participants provided fruitful insights into how 
blockchain technology might evolve to enable DP1. 
DP2: Sensor data are certified on the basis of cross-
validation. 
Most participants acknowledged that an 
implementation of DP2 would be needed, as either 
DP1 could not uniquely prevent all data tampering or 
it could not be implemented to the full extent. As such, 
one participant noted that “it is good that the 
dependence on DP1 is reduced by the introduction of 
DP2” (BC Sol Arch, Energy), and another stated that 
some kind of “cross-validation is always necessary 
because [even now] the reading of the sensor could be 
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influenced [in a manipulative way]” (Sol Arch, 
Automotive). Relating to future developments, a 
participant noted that “increasing the security by 
implementing DP2 is probably faster and more 
economically viable than perfecting the 
implementation of DP1, possibly with future 
technology” (PM Innovation, Automotive). 
Participants also noted that DP2 is “rather use-case 
specific” (PM BC, Manufacturing), in contrast to DP1, 
and speculated that “in some cases, it might be difficult 
to find appropriate data for cross-validation” (BC Dev, 
Software Consulting). Regarding the cold chain case, 
an interviewee suggested that “weather data could be 
combined with cooling power consumption data of the 
truck to detect anomalies” (BC Dev, Software 
Consulting). With respect to the microgrid case, they 
proposed to use data of “a transformer station 
supplying several houses with electricity” and 
“weather data in combination with power data from the 
installed solar panel” (BC Sol Arch, Energy) for cross-
validation. In the case of odometer fraud, the “cross-
validation could be expanded considerably with 
service and maintenance data,” for example, by 
“validating that the exchange of brake disks occurs 
after roughly 50,000 kilometers” (PM Innovation, 
Manufacturing). In essence, all participants supported 
DP2 and highlighted its context dependency as well as 
the interlinked nature of DP1 and DP2.  
DP3: Data owners determine when and to what extent 
their certified data are communicated to others. 
Generally, the participants stated that the privacy-
preserving mechanisms introduced through DP3 are 
very strong. According to one interviewee, “the 
propagation of information is organized well in the 
system and occurs in a very safe way” (BC Sol Arch, 
Energy). Three participants mentioned the upcoming 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the EU 
(European Commission, 2018) and noted that the most 
important parts thereof are covered in DP3 and its 
features (PM BC, Manufacturing; PM BC, Energy; PM 
Innovation, Manufacturing). One participant stressed 
additionally that “there is also an obligation to inform 
the data owner about how her data will be used by the 
receiving party” (PM BC, Energy), and another 
stressed that “there should be a possibility to revoke 
the sharing of data any time after the data has been sent 
for the first time” (PM Innovation, Manufacturing). 
Regarding the importance of privacy, it was noted that 
it is highly dependent on the specific data in question 
and, importantly, on data owner’s perceptions toward 
sharing these data (BC Dev, Manufacturing; BC Dev, 
Software Consulting). For example, people are “used 
to sharing their electricity consumption data with their 
energy supplier” (PM BC, Energy), and in a cold chain, 
“a driver might not perceive the sharing of temperature 
data as very sensitive” (BC Dev, Software Consulting). 
Therefore, a participant argued, “it might actually be a 
challenge to convince users that data privacy is 
valuable in their case” and raised the question of “How 
do you want to raise awareness for that?” (PM BC, 
Manufacturing). This statement is in line with the 
comment of another participant that “at the moment, 
privacy is typically driven by regulatory decisions [in 
Europe] and not by customer demand,” concluding that 
“currently, it is often not essential for flourishing 
businesses [to provide privacy-preserving solutions], 
but it will probably become a core feature in the future” 
(PM Innovation, Automotive). In line with this last 
comment, one participant noted that new technology 
enables gathering and transmitting data at a more 
granular level, possibly changing users’ perceptions as 
follows: “If you start sharing your electricity 
consumption on a minute basis, instead of delivering a 
quarterly or annual meter reading, you might get more 
uncomfortable” (PM BC, Energy). In summary, the 
participants appreciated DP3 and the corresponding 
design features. They also emphasized that privacy is 
becoming increasingly important as the technological 
performance and the ability to collect detailed data 
increases. 
DP4: Data are certified on the basis of a linearly 
scalable system architecture. 
Several participants noted that DP4, together with 
DP1, is essential for any solution trying to solve the 
problem of data protection and certification (BC Dev, 
Manufacturing; PM Innovation, Automotive). One 
participant with a strong business background said that 
this “needs to be fulfilled right away” (PM Innovation, 
Automotive). In general, the participants noted that the 
scalability provided by the proposed principles and 
features is indeed sufficient for real-world applications 
like, for example, the processing of the majority of all 
cars in the EU. One participant noted that the 
“scalability properties of blockchain-based solutions 
strongly depend on the use case at hand and the 
specific implementation,” continuing that “the often-
heard statement that anything involving blockchain 
technology does not scale and costs a lot is simply not 
true…as, for example, CertifiCar and the 
OpenTimestamps project reveal” (PM Innovation, 
Manufacturing). 
The hybrid approach of using both decentralized and 
traditional infrastructures was deemed appropriate by 
all interviewed blockchain experts, independent of the 
cases discussed. “Currently, such a solution can only 
be built on the basis of a hybrid approach” (PM BC, 
Energy), noted one participant, while another added 
that “taking into account the current state of the 
blockchain ecosystem, this approach definitely makes 
sense” (BC Dev, Manufacturing). However, 
considering future developments, many participants 
speculated (PM BC, Manufacturing; BC Dev, 
Software Consulting) that “it might be possible to build 
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the entire system on a decentralized infrastructure in 
[the distant] future” (BC Dev, Manufacturing), and it 
was also noted that already “many players are working, 
for example, towards decentralized storage solutions 
with throughput and scalability for enterprise 
environments” (BC Dev, Software Consulting). 
Regarding the question of whether a scalable 
protection system is better built without blockchain 
technology, i.e., disregarding DF6, many interviewees 
agreed (PM BC, Manufacturing; Sol Arch, 
Automotive) that “technically, this would be possible” 
(BC Dev, Software Consulting). However, different 
considerations in favor of the usage of blockchain 
technology were made. One participant noted that 
“using a blockchain to store the hashes makes sense 
whenever the certification happens in an environment 
with a multitude of parties with [partially] conflicting 
interests” (PM BC, Manufacturing). For example, in 
the case of odometer fraud, “the owner of the car, a 
potential buyer of the car, the car manufacturer, 
associated and independent workshops, and even 
different departments within a car manufacturer have 
different interests regarding odometer fraud” (PM BC, 
Manufacturing). Therefore, establishing a central 
database for all participants that is operated by just one 
of the involved parties is a major challenge. 
Uninvolved third parties could take over the 
responsibility to run such a system. It was also noted 
that “new business models based on other sensor data 
that are shared in a multiparty system” (Certification 
Expert, Inspection) will increase in importance. In 
principle, it “might be possible to find a traditional 
database provider [for this role]” (BC Dev, Software 
Consulting); however, it could be costly and 
potentially difficult to reach an agreement between all 
parties involved. “A blockchain provides a viable 
alternative in such a case, with no need to trust a third 
party” (BC Dev, Software Consulting). 
In addition, the participants noted that the “overhead of 
the blockchain is small—really expensive are 
[hardware] sensors and connectivity” (BC Dev, 
Manufacturing). The blockchain “can even reduce 
costs,” as its security is less dependent on third-party 
certification, which is costly and time-consuming (BC 
Dev, Manufacturing). This is especially important for 
smaller companies, which might not have the resources 
and processes to deploy highly secure databases. An 
expert in the research department of a multinational 
company stated that “the business side clearly does not 
see the need for a blockchain-based solution yet,” as 
they think that “a secure and trustworthy database can 
also be provided by the company itself” (Sol Arch, 
Automotive). In line with that, several participants 
noted that when a blockchain is used, the trust question 
is transferred to “technology” or “engineering,” while 
in traditional systems, it is addressed with “brand 
names” and “company processes” (BC Dev, 
Manufacturing; BC Sol Arch, Energy). 
An additional interesting point was made regarding the 
standardization potential of a solution relying on 
blockchain technology. An expert from the energy 
sector noted that individual energy suppliers “might be 
more willing to accept a solution as an industry 
standard if its cornerstone is based on blockchain 
technology, and this decreases the dependence on 
another company” (PM BC, Energy). In contrast, “if a 
solution’s core is in control of another energy supplier 
or technology provider, the adoption as a standard 
would be very difficult” (PM BC, Energy). 
In essence, the interviewees highlighted the 
importance of DP4 and agreed that the proposed 
features are indeed appropriate to address this design 
principle. Furthermore, they provide several reasons as 
to why a blockchain-based SDPS might be superior to 
a traditional solution in particular situations. First and 
foremost, they highlight the potential of blockchain 
technology in cases where sensor data protection must 
be ensured in ecosystems with multiple parties with 
conflicting interests. 
In summary, the nine interviews provided additional 
evidence of the usefulness of our proposed design. The 
participants reinforced the core considerations and 
major design decisions of the SDPS design. In 
addition, the interviews revealed new insights—for 
example, with respect to the evolution of blockchain 
technology and its specific business potential. The 
results also correspond to the findings from the 
development and evaluation of our prototype. 
However, by building upon additional slices of data 
(Beck et al., 2013), they go beyond a “one instance 
evaluation” of the design. 
7 Discussion 
7.1 SDPS Design Theory 
After the ex post evaluation, we integrated our findings 
and formulated a design theory as summarized in Table 
4, following the seminal work of Gregor and Jones 
(2007), who laid out six fundamental components of a 
design theory. We now review this and then discuss 
our findings in light of their theoretical and practical 
implications. 
According to Gregor and Jones (2007), the first 
component of a design theory is its purpose and scope. 
The aim of our artifact is to develop a system that 
protects IoT sensor data generation, processing, and 
exchange in a privacy-preserving and efficient manner. 
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Table 4: Components of an SDPS Design Theory 
1 Purpose and scope The aim is to develop a system that protects IoT sensor data generation, processing, 
and exchange in a privacy-preserving and efficient manner. 
2 Constructs • Tamper resistance  
• Privacy 
• Scalability  
• Economic feasibility 
• Certification 
3 Principles of form and function Design principles (DP1-4) to support the protection of IoT sensor data and 
corresponding design features (DF1-9) are presented. 
4 Artifact mutability  SDPSs must be mutable, specifically with respect to the amount of data they can 
handle. DR2 and DR3 articulate this fundamental thought, and DP4 subsequently 
poses a linearly scalable system.  
SDPS can be used with benefit by different organizations. However, they need to be 
adapted particularly with respect to cross-validation. The cross-validation data and the 
certification procedure are highly dependent on the context. 
5 Testable propositions • P1: The artifact enables tamper-resistant IoT sensor data generation, processing, 
and exchange 
• P2: The artifact enables privacy-preserving IoT sensor data generation, 
processing, and exchange 
• P3: The artifact is capable of processing large amounts of IoT sensor data 
• P4: The positive effects of the artifact are not negated by artifact development and 
operation costs 
6 Justificatory knowledge Design requirements are based on the literature on IoT, security, and privacy. Design 
principles are derived from theory on information asymmetry, privacy, and IS 
success. Design features build upon blockchain literature. 
 
With respect to the boundaries of the design, we wish 
to highlight that the development of the guidelines 
was clearly focused on the processing of IoT sensor 
data and the corresponding challenges, such as big 
data, multistage data processing pipelines, and 
distributed data processing across organizational 
boundaries or multiparty ecosystems. This problem 
class covers a wide range of relevant issues, which is 
in stark contrast to existing studies on SDPSs (e.g., 
Ayoade et al., 2018; Liang et al., 2017; Machado & 
Fröhlich, 2018) that focus on specific solutions to very 
specific problems. The generalizability within our 
wide problem class constitutes an important 
foundation for our theoretical contribution. 
The second component that Gregor and Jones (2007) 
depict is constructs, which represent core entities of 
interest in the design. The core constructs we propose 
are tamper resistance, privacy, scalability, and 
economic feasibility, which are reflected in our design 
requirements. These constructs capture the impact of 
an SDPS and may therefore serve as dependent 
variables in efforts to investigate SDPS success. In 
addition, the theory on information asymmetry 
(Akerlof, 1970) suggests that certification is a core 
concept and means to overcome information deficits 
and avoid opportunistic behavior, such as intentional 
data manipulation. We build upon these insights and 
base our design on certification. Therefore, 
certification is a fundamental, independent construct 
of our work. 
Regarding the third component of a design theory, we 
present principles of form and function that may serve 
as a blueprint for the construction of IoT sensor data 
protection systems. To this end, we identify the SDPS 
design requirements (DR1-4), derive design principles 
(DP1-4) to support the protection of the IoT sensor 
data, and depict corresponding design features (DF1-
9) (see Figure 3). The requirements, principles, and 
features constitute actionable guidelines, which 
highlights a core difference between our work and the 
extant research. Thereby, we reflect the various calls 
in the IS literature to support the development of 
implementable tools to increase security and privacy, 
especially in the IoT (Bélanger & Crossler, 2011; Lee 
et al., 2018; Medaglia & Serbanati 2010; Pavlou, 
2011). 
To account for the special nature of IS artifacts, 
Gregor and Jones (2007) call for explicitly addressing 
the mutable nature of these artifacts as a fourth 
component. In the case of SDPSs, we reflected on the 
importance of mutability, specifically regarding the 
amount of data they can handle. DR2 and DR3 
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articulate this fundamental thought, and DP4 
subsequently poses a linearly scalable system. 
However, the design that we derived is not universally 
applicable, nor is it “one-size-fits-all.” While SDPSs 
can be used beneficially by different organizations, 
they need to be adapted, particularly in terms of cross-
validation. The cross-validation data and the 
certification procedure are highly dependent on the 
context, as the development of the instantiation that 
we presented clearly indicates.  
The fifth component of a design theory comprises 
testable propositions. These propositions might be 
presented as “if a system or method that follows 
certain principles is instantiated, then it will work, or 
it will be better in some way than other systems or 
methods.” Following this argumentation, we can 
deduce propositions from the presented design 
requirements. The design requirements disentangle 
the notion of “it will work, or it will be better” into 
specific, contextualized needs that must be addressed 
by the artifact. Propositions postulate that these needs 
have been successfully addressed and serve as a basis 
for assessing the impact of the artifact. Applying this 
rationale to DR1-4, we deduce the following four 
propositions: the artifact enables tamper-resistant IoT 
sensor data generation, processing, and exchange 
(P1). The artifact enables privacy-preserving IoT 
sensor data generation, processing, and exchange 
(P2). The artifact is capable of processing large 
amounts of IoT sensor data (P3). The positive effects 
of the artifact are not negated by the artifact 
development and operation costs (P4). These 
propositions might be helpful in developing test cases 
for future instantiations.  
Finally, Gregor and Jones (2007) encourage scholars 
to justify their design. We base our design 
requirements on insights from the literature on IoT, 
security, and privacy (see Section 4.1). The design 
principles are mainly derived from theory on 
information asymmetry, privacy, and IS success (see 
Section 4.2). Ultimately, the design features build 
primarily upon the blockchain literature (see Section 
4.3). This theoretical grounding enabled us, in close 
interplay with insights from practice, to derive a set of 
purposive guidelines for the design of SDPSs in the 
form of DRs, DPs, and DFs. Gregor and Jones (2007) 
emphasize the importance of explanatory theory as a 
“linking mechanism for a number, or all, of the other 
aspects of the design theory” (p. 327). We reflect this 
role of explanatory theory by explicitly deriving 
design principles that serve as a link between design 
requirements and design features. This thorough 
conceptualization of the problem is a key distinction 
from previous literature (e.g., Ayoade et al., 2018; 
Liang et al., 2017; Machado & Fröhlich, 2018), and it 
facilitates the generalizability of our findings, which 
enables our theoretical contribution. 
7.2 Design Implications 
Our research has important design implications for 
SDPSs that address IoT-related security and privacy 
challenges (Ayoade et al., 2018; Crossler & Posey, 
2017; Liang et al., 2017), specifically with respect to the 
value proposition of blockchain technology. 
Blockchain-based SDPSs inherit core characteristics of 
blockchain technology (Notheisen et al., 2017) and are 
thus particularly useful in certain scenarios (see Table 
5). While SDPSs are used to protect simple data 
pipelines—for example, to secure data transfer from 
sensors to one single intraorganizational system—they 
are also leveraged in the case of multistage data 
pipelines that cross organizational boundaries and 
involve a potentially large ecosystem of players, as our 
prototype case reveals. In the latter case, blockchain-
based SDPSs are particularly valuable because they can 
protect sensor data even in large ecosystems with 
conflicting interests through the use of a shared, 
immutable ledger. In addition, a blockchain-based 
SDPS is a decentralized system. Hence, the involved 
parties are peers, and no single party controls the overall 
system (Beck, Müller-Bloch, & King, 2018). As our ex 
post evaluation reveals, such a system is often perceived 
as “neutral” and might be accepted as an industry 
standard much faster than a centralized system. Finally, 
important security and protection technologies, such as 
public-key cryptography, are already built into 
blockchain technology (Buterin, 2013; Noyen et al., 
2014). Additionally, the infrastructure to use these 
protocols is readily provided by a decentralized set of 
actors (e.g., miners), who are typically incentivized 
through the economics of cryptocurrencies. Essentially, 
blockchain technology offers a ready-to-use set of well-
defined security protocols. For smaller companies, in 
particular, that do not have cryptography specialists or 
corresponding technology available, blockchain-based 
SDPSs offer the opportunity to leverage state-of-the-art 
security technology that is usually license-free and often 
designed for rapid adoption. 
However, as our design theory reveals, blockchain-
based SDPSs must be carefully designed. Blockchain 
technology is not a universal solution that addresses the 
derived design requirements out of the box. The 
fundamental design implications must be considered to 
address the derived design requirements (see Table 6). 
With respect to DP1 (sensor data certified on the basis 
of source-to-sink protection), it is important to note that, 
as of today, sensors cannot communicate directly with 
the blockchain. Therefore, the data must be protected as 
early as possible in the processing chain by building and 
signing blockchain transactions as close as possible to 
the sensing units. In the future, blockchain-enabled 
sensors could drastically simplify this and might allow 
for signing within the sensing units themselves. In 
addition, DP2 (sensor data certified on the basis of 
cross-validation) must be carefully addressed. 
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Table 5: Blockchain-Based SDPS Usage Implications 
Blockchain 
characteristic 




• Blockchain integrates the advantages of 
distributed databases and crypto technology  
• Well-managed data redundancy across different 
parties 
• Secure data processing that fosters data integrity 
“using a blockchain to store the hashes makes sense 
whenever the certification happens in an 
environment with a multitude of parties with 




• No central authority 
• All parties are peers with the same rights 
• No single party controls the overall system 
“[members of an ecosystem] might be more willing 
to accept a solution as an industry standard if its 
cornerstone is based on blockchain technology and 
this decreases the dependence on another [single] 






• Private and public key cryptography built into the 
blockchain  
• Infrastructure readily provided by a decentralized 
set of actors incentivized through the economics 
of cryptocurrencies 
• Security does not rely on third-party certification, 
which is costly and time-consuming 
• Even smaller companies with no dedicated 
cybersecurity or cryptography specialists can 
leverage state-of-the-art security technology  
“overhead of the blockchain is small—really 
expensive are [hardware] sensors and connectivity” 
(BC Dev, Manufacturing), “the blockchain can 
reduce costs” (BC Dev, Manufacturing) 
 
More specifically, system designers must realize that 
blockchain technology generally cannot ensure 
“tamper-proof” processes, and the additional cross-
validation of the sensor data is necessary to enable 
effective tamper resistance. As such, a nondetection 
risk of fraud remains. With respect to DP3 (data 
owners determine when and to what extent their data 
are communicated to others) it should be noted that a 
blockchain is not a universal remedy that can 
guarantee privacy (Conti et al., 2018; Fabian et al., 
2016; Goldfeder et al., 2018; Kumar et al., 2017). In 
the context of sensor data sharing specifically, 
privacy mechanisms must be implemented on top of 
the blockchain in the form of an access management 
service. In addition, by relying on a hybrid 
blockchain approach, there must be assurances that 
the sensor data themselves are not stored on a public 
permissionless blockchain and that data integrity can 
be maintained. Finally, regarding DP4 (data certified 
on the basis of a linearly scalable system 
architecture), specific blockchain architectures must 
be implemented. With the current state of technology, 
hybrid blockchain architectures (Ayoade et al., 2018; 
Zyskind et al., 2015) are necessary to enable scaling. 
Therefore, viable systems store sensor values in a 
central repository and only the digital fingerprint 
(hash) of the sensor values is recorded on the 
blockchain. 
7.3 Theoretical and Practical 
Contributions 
In summary, the proposed SDPS design theory is the 
key theoretical contribution of our work. We 
synthesize our design into a conceptual solution that 
addresses a whole problem class. Notably, the 
codification and abstraction of our design, including 
the design requirements, design principles, and 
design features, enables generalizability beyond a 
particular problem. The provision of actionable 
guidelines based on such a thorough 
conceptualization is, to the best of our knowledge, a 
novel contribution. As such, we add to the literature 
on IoT and IoT-related security and privacy 
challenges, as well as to the literature on blockchain 
technology. 
More specifically, our investigation of the problem 
class confirms and conceptualizes earlier evidence 
from the literature (Aggarwal et al., 2013; Lowry et 
al., 2017) that the distributed, multilayered nature of 
IoT systems, as well as IoT ecosystems with multiple 
parties and potentially diverging interests, introduces 
very specific and particularly serious challenges. The 
derived design requirements can serve as a basis for 
future research—for example, investigating how their 
fulfillment affects the adoption of IoT IS. 
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Table 6: Design implications for Blockchain-Based SDPS 

















• Data must be protected as early as possible in the processing chain 
• In the prototype, we collected odometer data and preprocessed them as soon as possible in a way that data manipulation 
from that point on was prevented, and we built and signed the blockchain transaction as close as possible to the 
odometer sensing unit 
• However, in the prototype, we could only do this rather late in the processing chain, as a blockchain cannot be directly 















• “[Source-to-sink protection] is a necessary basis to guarantee the validity of sensor data” (BC Dev, Manufacturing) 
• “In practice, it is difficult to comply 100% with [source-to-sink protection],” especially “in the fragmented ecosystem 
of the IoT” (PM BC, Manufacturing) 
• Implementation of DP1 could become easier, for example, “if sensors can communicate directly with the blockchain” 
(PM Innovation, Automotive) or at least “sign transactions” (BC Dev, Manufacturing) 

















• Blockchain technology cannot ensure “tamper-proof” processes per se, so additional cross-validation is necessary to 
enable effective tamper resistance, and a nondetection risk of fraud remains 
• Initial prototype verification procedure detects odometer reductions but not continuous odometer fraud 















• “[Blockchain] will probably never be a way to ensure a completely tamper-proof solution” (PM Innovation, 
Automotive) 
• “[Some kind of] cross-validation is always necessary because already the reading of the sensor could be influenced [in 
a manipulative way]” (Sol Arch, Automotive) 
• DP2 is “rather use-case specific” (PM BC, Manufacturing) 

















• Blockchain technology cannot ensure data privacy per se, so privacy must be implemented on top of the blockchain in 
the form of an access management service 
• Feedback of 16 prototype users that fine-grained sharing mechanisms must be implemented 















• “There should be a possibility to revoke the sharing of data any time” (PM Innovation, Manufacturing) 
• “The propagation of information is organized well [in the proposed design] and occurs in a very safe way” (BC Sol 
Arch, Energy) 

















• Hybrid blockchain architecture necessary to enable scaling 
• Odometer sensor values are stored in a central repository, and only the digital fingerprint (hash) of the records is 
recorded on-chain 
• System for 100 cars was deployed on the basis of two low-performance standard Amazon EC2 instances, and there 















• “Scalability properties of blockchain-based solutions strongly depend on the use case at hand and the specific 
implementation” (PM Innovation, Manufacturing) 
• “The often-heard statement that anything involving blockchain technology does not scale and costs a lot is simply not 
true” (PM Innovation, Manufacturing) 
• “Currently, such a solution can only be built on the basis of a hybrid approach” (PM BC, Energy) 
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Furthermore, we base the design principles, in 
particular, on the theory of information asymmetry, 
which has been used before as a fruitful basis in the 
design of IS that enables the reliable exchange of data 
(e.g., Notheisen et al., 2017). In contrast to the existing 
SDPS-related literature, we specifically focus on 
certification as a well-known means of overcoming 
information asymmetries. As such, we leverage deep 
insights from the existing body of knowledge on 
information asymmetries (Bond, 1982; Genesove, 
1993; Spence, 1976) and on certification, in particular 
(Akerlof, 1970; Albersmeier et al., 2009), which we 
strongly believe represents a useful basis for other 
design research in the realm of SDPSs. 
Finally, we discuss the design features and the design 
implications of our research on the usage of blockchain 
technology in detail. Notably, we shed light on the 
advantages as well as the potential pitfalls of using a 
blockchain for SDPSs. We elaborate how the proposed 
design can address the widely discussed shortcomings 
of blockchains, such as scalability and privacy. We do 
this by building upon the existing research on hybrid 
blockchain architectures (Ayoade et al., 2018; Zyskind 
et al., 2015) and thereby encourage design researchers 
to specifically reflect the latest developments in this 
domain. 
With regard to practical contributions, we provide a 
blueprint that guides the development of SDPSs. 
Furthermore, we address emerging blockchain 
concerns that more and more practitioners share: 
namely, that blockchains have no scalability, that they 
induce high costs, and that they cannot ensure privacy. 
Our design—and, more specifically, the prototype—
reveals that these concerns can be addressed with 
existing technology. This might inspire practitioners to 
overcome their concerns and start leveraging 
blockchain technology for their enterprises. In 
addition, in line with the existing research (Beck et al., 
2016; Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016), our evaluation 
reveals where the use of blockchains might be 
particularly helpful in practice. Ecosystems with a 
multitude of parties with potentially conflicting 
interests often rely on an intermediary to ensure 
reliable data exchange and trust. In these cases, 
blockchain technology might serve as such an 
intermediary. Additionally, blockchain-based 
solutions might facilitate the establishment of industry 
standards. Finally, in light of ever-increasing 
regulation, blockchain-based solutions might serve as 
a cost-efficient complement to third-party certification. 
Smaller companies, in particular, might benefit from 
the ready-to-use security protocols and corresponding 
infrastructure that the blockchain provides. In the 
realm of IoT, however, physical devices must be 
blockchain-enabled. As of today, the data pipeline too 
often remains unprotected directly after the data leave 
the sensing unit of such devices. 
8 Conclusion 
Our study uses a design science research approach to 
propose a design theory for a sensor data protection 
system (SDPS). More specifically, we derive design 
requirements, design principles, and design features 
for a blockchain-based SDPS. In addition, we design 
and develop an instantiation of an SDPS (CertifiCar) 
on the basis of three iterative cycles. Our prototype 
prevents the fraudulent manipulation of car mileage 
data. Finally, we provide an ex post evaluation of our 
design theory considering two additional use cases in 
the realms of pharmaceutical supply chains (Modum, 
2018) and energy microgrids (Mengelkamp et al., 
2018). The findings of our evaluation suggest that the 
proposed design ensures the tamper-resistant 
gathering, processing, and exchange of IoT sensor data 
in a privacy-preserving, scalable, and efficient manner. 
The results of this study should be assessed in light of 
its limitations. We derive design principles on the basis 
of specific theoretical lenses. Building upon an 
alternative selection of theoretical lenses, we might 
have identified different or additional design 
requirements and principles (see Meth et al., 2015). 
However, the chosen theories are well accepted and 
undisputed and represent a reliable and stable basis for 
analysis. In addition, our evaluation confirms that our 
design principles are concise and independent of 
current technology and upcoming technology 
developments, as well as applicable to the chosen 
problem class across different use cases. A second 
limitation refers to the design features that are 
grounded in the capabilities of today’s blockchain 
technology. Blockchain technology is at an early stage 
of development (Beck et al., 2017), and new on-
chain/off-chain approaches are still emerging (Ayoade 
et al., 2018; Machado & Fröhlich, 2018; Zyskind et al., 
2015). Therefore, the proposed design features might 
change with future, potentially disruptive blockchain 
breakthroughs. However, we wish to highlight the fact 
that we build upon the latest blockchain research at the 
forefront of technology, and that our features reflect 
latest on-chain/off-chain architecture approaches that 
provide a viable tradeoff between security and 
scalability (Ayoade et al., 2018; Zyskind et al., 2015). 
A third limitation is related to the evaluation of our 
design theory. We developed and evaluated CertifiCar 
and investigated two additional use cases to reflect our 
design. While a quantitative and broader evaluation is 
desirable and encouraged, at this point in time, 
corresponding systems and domain experts simply are 
not widely available. 
Beyond the aforementioned opportunities, there are 
many other possible extensions to our work. We 
contribute to an emerging literature stream that aims to 
advance the theoretical understanding of blockchain 
technology. We hope that our study serves as a fruitful 
basis for further research on how blockchain 
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technology facilitates new modes of ecosystem 
collaboration—for example, by establishing security, 
privacy, and trust. More specifically, we encourage 
scholars to investigate and compare the various 
blockchain-based data protection approaches that are 
currently emerging with respect to their business 
potential (Risius & Spohrer, 2017). Finally, while there 
are several industry initiatives, such as the Trusted IoT 
Alliance, and many companies are currently 
developing promising use cases, we see an absence of 
design and theory to bridge the gap between 
technology and business. Blockchain technology is 
rapidly evolving, but its business potential remains 
vague. It is not only researchers who have been too 
optimistic about the potential of blockchain technology 
(Beck et al., 2017). In practice, blockchain technology 
is still overhyped, and discussions are either very 
technology-focused or business-driven without 
reflecting the actual capabilities and restrictions of the 
current technology. In line with Bélanger and 
Crossler’s (2011) call for more actionable solutions, 
we encourage design science researchers to fill the 
articulated gap and link (business) problem classes to 
blockchain technology and corresponding 
applications. 
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Figure A-1. First Implementation of the Web-Based User Interface 
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